Ronald Edward Sparrow Appellant
Her Majesty The Queen Respondent
The National Indian Brotherhood / Assembly
of First Nations, the B.C. Wildlife Federation,
the Steelhead Society of British Columbia,
the Pacific Fishermen’s Defence Alliance,
Northern Trollers’ Association, the Pacific
Gillnetters’ Association, the Gulf Trollers’
Association, the Pacific Trollers’ Association,
the Prince Rupert Fishing Vessel Owners’ Association,
the Fishing Vessel Owners’ Association of British
Columbia, the Pacific Coast Fishing Vessel Owners’
Guild, the Prince Rupert Fishermen’s Cooperative
Association, the Co-op Fishermen’s Guild, Deep
Sea Trawlers’ Association of B.C., the Fisheries
Council of British Columbia, the United
Fishermen and Allied Workers’ Union,
the Attorney General for Ontario,
the Attorney General of Quebec,
the Attorney General of British Columbia,
the Attorney General for Saskatchewan,
the Attorney General for Alberta
and the Attorney General of Newfoundland Interveners
indexed as: r. v. sparrow
File No.: 20311.
1988: November 3; 1990: May 31.
Present: Dickson C.J. and McIntyre*, Lamer, Wilson, La Forest, L’Heureux-Dubé and Sopinka JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for british columbia
Constitutional law — Aboriginal rights — Fishing rights — Indian convicted of fishing with net larger than permitted by Band’s licence ‑‑ Whether or not net length restriction inconsistent with s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 — Constitution Act, 1982 , ss. 35(1) , 52(1) — Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14, s. 34 — British Columbia Fishery (General) Regulations, SOR/84-248, ss. 4, 12, 27(1), (4).
Indians — Aboriginal rights — Fishing rights — Interpretation ‑‑ Indian convicted of fishing with net larger than permitted by Band’s licence ‑‑ Whether or not net length restriction inconsistent with s. 35(1) of Constitution Act, 1982.
Appellant was charged in 1984 under the Fisheries Act with fishing with a drift net longer than that permitted by the terms of his Band’s Indian food fishing licence. He admitted that the facts alleged constitute the offence, but defended the charge on the basis that he was exercising an existing aboriginal right to fish and that the net length restriction contained in the Band’s licence was invalid in that it was inconsistent with s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 .
Appellant was convicted. The trial judge found that an aboriginal right could not be claimed unless it was supported by a special treaty and that s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 accordingly had no application. An appeal to County Court was dismissed for similar reasons. The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge’s findings of facts were insufficient to lead to an acquittal. Its decision was appealed and cross-appealed. The constitutional question before this Court queried whether the net length restriction contained in the Band’s fishing licence was inconsistent with s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 .
Held: The appeal and cross-appeal should be dismissed. The constitutional question should be sent back to trial to be answered according to the analysis set out in these reasons.
Section 35(1) applies to rights in existence when the Constitution Act, 1982 came into effect; it does not revive extinguished rights. An existing aboriginal right cannot be read so as to incorporate the specific manner in which it was regulated before 1982. The phrase “existing aboriginal rights” must be interpreted flexibly so as to permit their evolution over time.
The Crown failed to discharge its burden of proving extinguishment. An aboriginal right is not extinguished merely by its being controlled in great detail by the regulations under the Fisheries Act. Nothing in the Fisheries Act or its detailed regulations demonstrated a clear and plain intention to extinguish the Indian aboriginal right to fish. These fishing permits were simply a manner of controlling the fisheries, not of defining underlying rights. Historical policy on the part of the Crown can neither extinguish the existing aboriginal right without clear intention nor, in itself, delineate that right. The nature of government regulations cannot be determinative of the content and scope of an existing aboriginal right. Government policy can, however, regulate the exercise of that right but such regulation must be in keeping with s. 35(1) .
Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 , at the least, provides a solid constitutional base upon which subsequent negotiations can take place and affords aboriginal peoples constitutional protection against provincial legislative power. Its significance, however, extends beyond these fundamental effects. The approach to its interpretation is derived from general principles of constitutional interpretation, principles relating to aboriginal rights, and the purposes behind the constitutional provision itself.
Section 35(1) is to be construed in a purposive way. A generous, liberal interpretation is demanded given that the provision is to affirm aboriginal rights. The provision is not subject to s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . Any law or regulation affecting aboriginal rights, however, will not automatically be of no force or effect by the operation of s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 . Legislation that affects the exercise of aboriginal rights will be valid if it meets the test for justifying an interference with a right recognized and affirmed under s. 35(1) .
Section 35(1) does not explicitly authorize the courts to assess the legitimacy of any government legislation that restricts aboriginal rights. The words “recognition and affirmation”, however, incorporate the government’s responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to aboriginal peoples and so import some restraint on the exercise of sovereign power. Federal legislative powers continue, including the right to legislate with respect to Indians pursuant to s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 , but must be read together with s. 35(1) . Federal power must be reconciled with federal duty and the best way to achieve that reconciliation is to demand the justification of any government regulation that infringes upon or denies aboriginal rights.
The test for justification requires that a legislative objective must be attained in such a way as to uphold the honour of the Crown and be in keeping with the unique contemporary relationship, grounded in history and policy, between the Crown and Canada’s aboriginal peoples. The extent of legislative or regulatory impact on an existing aboriginal right may be scrutinized so as to ensure recognition and affirmation. Section 35(1) does not promise immunity from government regulation in contemporary society but it does hold the Crown to a substantive promise. The government is required to bear the burden of justifying any legislation that has some negative effect on any aboriginal right protected under s. 35(1) .
The first question to be asked is whether the legislation in question has the effect of interfering with an existing aboriginal right. The inquiry begins with a reference to the characteristics or incidents of the right at stake. Fishing rights are not traditional property rights. They are rights held by a collective and are in keeping with the culture and existence of that group. Courts must be careful to avoid the application of traditional common law concepts of property as they develop their understanding of the “sui generis” nature of aboriginal rights. While it is impossible to give an easy definition of fishing rights, it is crucial to be sensitive to the aboriginal perspective itself on the meaning of the rights at stake.
To determine whether the fishing rights have been interfered with such as to constitute a prima facie infringement of s. 35(1) , certain questions must be asked. Is the limitation unreasonable? Does the regulation impose undue hardship? Does the regulation deny to the holders of the right their preferred means of exercising that right? The onus of proving a prima facie infringement lies on the individual or group challenging the legislation.
Here, the regulation would be found to be a prima facie interference if it were found to be an adverse restriction on the exercise of the natives’ right to fish for food. The issue does not merely require looking at whether the fish catch has been reduced below that needed for the reasonable food and ceremonial needs. Rather the test involves asking whether either the purpose or the effect of the restriction on net length unnecessarily infringes the interests protected by the fishing right.
If a prima facie interference is found, the analysis moves to the issue of justification. This test involves two steps. First, is there a valid legislative objective? Here the court would inquire into whether the objective of Parliament in authorizing the department to enact regulations regarding fisheries is valid. The objective of the department in setting out the particular regulations would also be scrutinized. The “public interest” justification is so vague as to provide no meaningful guidance and so broad as to be unworkable as a test for the justification of a limitation on constitutional rights. The justification of conservation and resource management, however, is uncontroversial.
If a valid legislative objective is found, the analysis proceeds to the second part of the justification issue: the honour of the Crown in dealings with aboriginal peoples. The special trust relationship and the responsibility of the government vis-à-vis aboriginal people must be the first consideration in determining whether the legislation or action in question can be justified. There must be a link between the question of justification and the allocation of priorities in the fishery. The constitutional recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights may give rise to conflict with the interests of others given the limited nature of the resource.
Guidelines are necessary to resolve the allocational problems that arise regarding the fisheries. Any allocation of priorities after valid conservation measures have been implemented must give top priority to Indian food fishing.
The justificatory standard to be met may place a heavy burden on the Crown. However, government policy with respect to the British Columbia fishery, regardless of s. 35(1) , already dictates that, in allocating the right to take fish, Indian food fishing is to be given priority over the interests of other user groups. Section 35(1) requires the Crown to ensure that its regulations are in keeping with that allocation of priority and guarantees that those plans treat aboriginal peoples in a way ensuring that their rights are taken seriously.
Within the analysis of justification, there are further questions to be addressed, depending on the circumstances of the inquiry. These include: whether there has been as little infringement as possible in order to effect the desired result; whether, in a situation of expropriation, fair compensation is available; and whether the aboriginal group in question has been consulted with respect to the conservation measures being implemented. This list is not exhaustive.
Applied: Jack v. The Queen,  1 S.C.R. 294; Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario,  A.C. 700; Nowegijick v. The Queen,  1 S.C.R. 29; Guerin v. The Queen,  2 S.C.R. 335; R. v. Taylor and Williams (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 360; considered: R. v. Denny (1990), 9 W.C.B. (2d) 438, Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, March 5, 1990; R. v. Hare and Debassige (1985), 20 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Eninew, R. v. Bear (1984), 12 C.C.C. (3d) 365 (Sask. C.A.), aff’g (1983), 7 C.C.C. (3d) 443 (Sask. Q.B.); distinguished: R. v. Derriksan (1976), 71 D.L.R. (3d) 159 (S.C.C.); referred to: Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia (1970), 74 W.W.R. 481 (B.C.C.A.), aff’d  S.C.R. 313; Attorney-General for Ontario v. Bear Island Foundation (1984), 49 O.R. (2d) 353 (H.C.); Re Steinhauer and The Queen (1985), 15 C.R.R. 175 (Alta. Q.B.); Martin v. The Queen (1985), 17 C.R.R. 375 (N.B.Q.B.); R. v. Agawa (1988), 28 O.A.C. 201; St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.); Baker Lake (Hamlet) v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development,  1 F.C. 518 (T.D.); R. v. Wesley,  2 W.W.R. 337; Prince and Myron v. The Queen,  S.C.R. 81; R. v. Sutherland,  2 S.C.R. 451; Simon v. The Queen,  2 S.C.R. 387; Johnson v. M’Intosh (1823), 8 Wheaton 543 (U.S.S.C.); Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul,  2 S.C.R. 654; Pasco v. Canadian National Railway Co.,  1 C.N.L.R. 35 (B.C.S.C.); Reference re Manitoba Language Rights,  1 S.C.R. 721; Kruger v. The Queen,  1 S.C.R. 104.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
British Columbia Fishery (General) Regulations, SOR/84-248, ss. 4, 12(1), (2), 27(1), (4).
British Columbia Terms of Union, R.S.C., 1985, App. II, No. 10, art. 13.
Constitution Act, 1930.
Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14, ss. 34, 61(1).
Quebec Boundaries Extension Act, 1912, S.C. 1912, c. 45.
Royal Proclamation of 1763, R.S.C., 1985, App. II, No. 1.
Wildlife Act, S.B.C. 1966, c. 55.
Canada. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. In All Fairness: A Native Claims Policy ‑ Comprehensive Claims. Ottawa: 1981.
Canada. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy. Ottawa: 1969.
Clement, W. H. P. The Law of the Canadian Constitution, 3rd ed. Toronto: Carswells, 1916.
Little Bear, Leroy. “A Concept of Native Title,”  5 Can. Legal Aid Bul. 99.
Lyon, Noel. “An Essay on Constitutional Interpretation” (1988), 26 Osgoode Hall L.J. 95.
McNeil, Kent. “The Constitutional Rights of the Aboriginal People of Canada” (1982), 4 Supreme Court L.R. 255.
Sanders, Douglas. “Pre-existing Rights: The Aboriginal Peoples of Canada,” in Gérald A. Beaudoin and Ed Ratushny, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , 2nd ed. Toronto: Carswells, 1989.
Schwartz, Bryan. First Principles, Second Thoughts: Aboriginal People, Constitutional Reform and Canadian Statecraft. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1986.
Slattery, Brian. “The Hidden Constitution: Aboriginal Rights in Canada” (1984), 32 Am. J. of Comp. Law 361.
Slattery, Brian. “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1987), 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727.
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (1986), 9 B.C.L.R. (2d) 300, 36 D.L.R. (4th) 246,  2 W.W.R. 577, allowing an appeal from a judgment of Lamperson Co. Ct. J.,  B.C.W.L.D. 599, dismissing an appeal from conviction by Goulet Prov. Ct. J. Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed. The constitutional question should be sent back to trial to be answered according to the analysis set out in these reasons.
For complete Supreme Court Judgement